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Abstract
The Beckerian approach to tax compliance examines how a tax au-
thority can maximize social welfare by trading-o¤ audit probability
against the ne rate on undeclared tax. This paper o¤ers an alterna-
tive examination of the privately optimal behavior of a tax authority
tasked by government to maximize expected revenue. The tax author-
ity is able to trade-o¤ audit probability against audit e¤ectiveness,
but takes the ne rate as xed in the short run. I nd that the tax
authoritys privately optimal audit strategy does not maximize vol-
untary compliance, and that voluntary compliance is non-monotonic
as a function of the tax authoritys budget. Last, the tax authoritys
privately optimal e¤ective ne rate on undeclared tax does not exceed
two at interior optima.
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1 Introduction
The economics of tax compliance has at its foundations the seminal analy-
sis of Becker (1968) on optimal law enforcement: the inuential portfolio
model of tax compliance (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972; Christiansen, 1980;
Srinivasan, 1973; Yitzhaki, 1974) can be seen as little more than a specic
application of Beckers more general analysis.
The Beckerian approach considers the socially optimal enforcement strat-
egy in respect of the trade-o¤ between the ne rate and the probability of
detection. A key insight is that a government concerned with maximizing
the expected utility of a representative citizen should set the ne rate on
undeclared tax as high as possible, and the audit probability as low as possi-
ble (hang em with probability zero). Subsequent literature analyzing this
trade-o¤ includes Kolm (1973), Stern (1978) and Polinsky and Shavell (1979).
The analysis here di¤ers from the Beckerian approach in two important re-
spects. First, whereas Becker considers the socially optimal enforcement
strategy, I consider the tax authoritys privately optimal enforcement strat-
egy for a given objective function set by government. In this sense, there is
no presumption that the equilibrium of the model is socially e¢ cient: the
model aims to be descriptive rather than prescriptive.
The second di¤erence is that, whereas the Beckerian framework focuses on
the trade-o¤between audit probability and the ne rate, I focus on the trade-
o¤ between audit probability and audit e¤ectiveness (the proportion of non-
compliance that an audit detects). Although this dimension of enforcement
strategy has received little attention - the standard portfolio model assumes
that the tax authority is able to perform investigations that are fully e¤ec-
tive - I argue that it is of greater practical signicance to the work of tax
authorities than is the trade-o¤ between audit probability and ne rates.
The ability of the tax authority to set ne rates is much more limited than is
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typically recognized in the literature (Slemrod, 2007). Even though ne rates
can be adjusted in the long run, the need for punishments to be proportion-
ate to the perceived seriousness of the crime acts as a powerful constraint.
For instance, Kirchler et al. (2003) nd socially positive attitudes towards
tax avoidance, suggesting that some types of non-compliance are socially ac-
ceptable. In a list of crimes, tax evasion is ranked as being only slightly
more serious than stealing a bicycle (Song and Yarbrough, 1978); and as no
more serious than minimum wage law violations (Burton et al., 2005). The
policy relevance of Beckers hang em with probability zeroequilibrium has
therefore been questioned, given its stark deviation from observed practice
(Dhami and al-Nowaihi, 2006).
The few studies that do allow for imperfect audit e¤ectiveness include Alm
(1988), Alm and McKee (2006), Reinganum and Wilde (1986) and Snow
and Warren Jr. (2005a,b). None of these studies, however, investigates the
trade-o¤ between audit e¤ectiveness and audit probability. Reinganum and
Wilde (1986) assume that audits are either fully e¤ective or fully ine¤ective.
However, it seems more realistic to allow for audits to be partially e¤ective.
Also, their approach implies that, if taxpayers are able to compute compound
lotteries correctly, the compliance e¤ect of a change in audit e¤ectiveness is
simply the same as the e¤ect of an equivalent change in audit probability
(Alm and McKee, 2006). Therefore, I adopt the approach of Snow and
Warren Jr. (2005a,b), who allow audits to detect a proportion q 2 [0; 1] of
undeclared income. With this approach, audit e¤ectiveness enters taxpayer
utility in a di¤erent manner to audit probability, making the compliance
e¤ects of these two parameters distinct.
Similar to the model of Reinganum and Wilde (1985), I model the strategic
interaction between taxpayers and the tax authority in a principal-agent
setting where the tax authority (principal) commits to an audit strategy, then
taxpayers (agents) maximize expected utility, taking as given the choice of the
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tax authority. However, income - a random variable in Reinganum andWilde
(1985) - is, in my model, an exogenous variable, equal across taxpayers. This
simplication implies that random auditing is weakly optimal, which moves
the focus of the model away from the problem of optimal audit selection
towards the problem of how to set a common audit probability, given the
reaction function of taxpayers and the trade-o¤ between audit probability
and e¤ectiveness. By contrast, when taxpayers di¤er in income, Reinganum
and Wilde (1985) show that there exist audit strategies which condition on
taxpayers reported incomes (such as a cuto¤ rule) that may dominate a
random audit strategy.
Although I shall argue that my approach is consistent with that of Becker,
I nevertheless demonstrate that it gives rise to a number of descriptively
important di¤erences in prediction. First, the expected-revenue maximiz-
ing audit strategy does not maximize voluntary compliance. Instead, the
optimal audit probability exceeds that consistent with the maximization of
compliance such that, in equilibrium, a marginal increase in the probability
of audit reduces declared income.
Second, although the tax authority still has an incentive to raise the ne rate
if it is able, Beckers hang em with probability zeroequilibrium does not
emerge. Rather, at all interior solutions of the model, the optimal e¤ective
ne rate on undeclared tax does not exceed two. Third, compliance is non-
monotonic in the tax authoritys budget.
As extensions to the basic model I investigate the implications for my results
if taxpayers exhibit probability weighting of the form supposed by prospect
theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992), and
if taxpayers are uncertain as to the true audit probability or e¤ectiveness.
The plan of the paper is as follows: Section 2 motivates the main aspects of
my approach, while Section 3 outlines a model of taxpayerscompliance de-
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cision, and the tax authoritys optimal audit strategy. Section 4 analyzes the
main results, and Section 5 provides some extensions. Section 6 concludes.
2 Modelling the Tax Authority
In modern government, responsibility for the collection of taxes is often de-
coupled from the setting of scal policy - the former being considered an
operational matter, the latter one of policy. For instance, in the US, respon-
sibility for the collection of taxes resides with an operational bureau of the
Department of the Treasury, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), whereas
responsibility for scal policy lies on the policy side of the Department - the
O¢ ce of Tax Policy. This structure is mirrored in the UK between H.M.
Treasury and its collection agency, H.M. Revenue and Customs (HMRC).
Therefore, although tax rates are endogenous at the level of government,
they are typically exogenous to the tax authority itself, which instead has a
narrow operational remit.
The precise nature of the tax authoritys objective function is typically ne-
gotiated by the tax authority with government. It remains debated as to the
choice of objective function politicians seek to apply. From a law enforcement
perspective, the relevant objective would be to maximize voluntary compli-
ance. However, as well as law enforcement, politicians may have an instru-
mental concern for maximizing expected revenue (which comprises receipts
and penalties from audit activity, in addition to voluntary compliance).
Consistent with the latter interpretation, the British tax authority, HMRC,
is committed to a legal obligation to maximize expected revenue (Ratto,
Thomas and Ulph, 2009). Although the best characterization of the IRS
is less clear, Plumley and Steuerle (2004) state that IRS enforcement pro-
grams have traditionally pursued the objective of maximizing the revenue
that they produce from the taxpayers whom they contact, subject to their
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budget constraint.Expected revenue maximization is also assumed as the
tax authoritys objective function in the literature on optimal audit rules
(e.g. Graetz et al., 1986; Reinganum and Wilde, 1985, 1986). Accordingly,
in what follows I assume the remit of the tax authority is to maximize ex-
pected revenue.
Tax authorities must compete with other government agencies for a budget
settlement. Again, this implies that, although the tax authoritys budget
is endogenous at the level of government, it is largely exogenous to the tax
authority itself - at least in the short run. The problem facing tax authorities
is therefore to maximize tax revenue for a given budget. In this sense the
concern of the paper is not how the tax authoritys budget compares with
any putative social optimum (see Slemrod and Yitzhaki, 1987), but on how
the tax authority chooses to spend its pre-determined budget.
Without levers over scal policy and its overall budget, the principal tools
available to tax authorities are the legal right to perform compliance audits,
and to levy nes on detected non-compliance. However, following the discus-
sion in the Introduction, I assume that the constraints on the setting of the
ne rate are su¢ ciently strong that the tax authority treats it as xed.
The tool which tax authorities can most readily use to maximize tax revenue
is therefore the ability to perform audits. For a given audit technology, the
tax authoritys audit strategy can be summarized by the pair (p; q) where
p is audit probability and q is audit e¤ectiveness. The tax authority can
be modelled as choosing either p or q, as for a given choice of one, the
other is determined endogenously by the budget constraint: the tax authority
therefore faces a trade-o¤ between the number of audits it performs, and the
e¤ectiveness of each audit.
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3 A Model
3.1 Preliminaries
My modelling of the scal environment is based on that of Yitzhaki (1974).
In particular, there are n taxpayers, each with an exogenous taxable income
y (which is known by the taxpayer but not by the tax authority). The
government levies a proportional income tax at marginal rate  on declared
income x. A proportion p of taxpayers are randomly selected for audit each
year and, when performed, an audit detects a proportion q of the true level of
undeclared tax. Taxpayers face a ne at rate f > 1 on all detected undeclared
tax, giving an e¤ectivene rate of qf .
The timing of the model is as follows: in the rst stage, the tax authority
publicly pre-commits to a pair (p; q), and in the second stage, taxpayers
choose an optimal level of declared income, taking as given the tax-authoritys
choice of (p; q).
3.2 TaxpayersProblem
Taxpayers are assumed to act as if they maximize expected utility, where
utility, U [], satises the following properties:
A1. U [x] is continuous and twice di¤erentiable for all x  0.
A2. U 0 [x] > 0 and U 00 [x] < 0.
A3. A [x]   U 00 [x] =U 0 [x] is decreasing in x.
Assumption A1 is a standard technical assumption. Assumption A2 implies
that taxpayers are risk averse. Following Arrow (1965) and Allingham and
Sandmo (1972), assumption A3 is decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA).
Taxpayers choose x, taking scal policy and the tax authoritys audit strategy
as given, yielding the problem
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max
x
E [U ] = (1  p)U [y   x] + pU [y   x  qf (y   x)] . (1)
For notational convenience I dene
Wg  y   x; Wb  Wg   qf (y   x) ; (2)
then di¤erentiating expected utility in (1) with respect to x gives
@E [U ]
@x
 T [x; p] =  fp (qf   1)U 0 [Wb]  (1  p)U 0 [Wg]g . (3)
The rst order condition for an interior maximum of (1) is therefore T [x; p] =
0, which implicitly denes a function x [p; qf ] that maps taxpayersoptimal
income declaration as a function of the audit probability and the e¤ective
ne rate. The second derivative of expected utility is given by
@2E [U ]
(@x)2
 D [x; p] = 2 (1  p)U 00 [Wg] + p (qf   1)2 U 00 [Wb]	 . (4)
The second order condition, D < 0, is satised by the assumption of strict
concavity of the utility function. The conditions for the existence of an
interior maximum are
U 0 [y]
U 0 [y (1  qf)] <
p (qf   1)
1  p < 1. (5)
The rst condition in (5) requires as a necessary condition that qf > 1, for
if qf < 1 non-compliance pays even in the audit state. The second condition
in (5) requires that pqf < 1, which is the standard condition that the tax
gamble must be better than fair.
3.3 Audit E¤ectiveness
I assume that audit e¤ectiveness is a function of the labor expended, q =
h [L], where h [] has the following properties:
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A4. h [L] is continuous and twice di¤erentiable for all L  0.
A5. h[0] = 0 and limL"1 h[L] = 1.
A6. h0 [] > 0.
A7. h00 [] < 0.
Assumption A4 is a standard technical assumption. Assumption A5 is the
idea that if the tax authority does not expend any resource on an audit, it
will not detect any non-compliance, but a very resource-intensive audit can
ultimately detect all non-compliance. Assumption A6 is that audit e¤ec-
tiveness increases as a function of labor. Last, assumption A7 is that audit
e¤ectiveness exhibits diminishing returns to labor. Diminishing returns in
this context can arise as, unlike many other types of crime, non-compliance
takes a great many shapes and forms, each of which di¤ers according to the
ease with which it can be detected. The most readily detectable forms of non-
compliance may be exposed relatively cheaply, but it becomes increasingly
labor consuming to detect further instances of non-compliance.1
3.4 Tax Authoritys Problem
Let 0  k  n be the number of audits performed by the tax authority. For
a xed budget allocation b, and normalizing the price of labor to pL = 1,
the budget constraint of the tax authority is given by kL  b and the audit
probability by
p  k
n
, (6)
where p 2 [0; 1]. If the tax authoritys budget constraint is binding I have
from (6) and the budget constraint that
1In practice, the di¢ culty of proving some instances of non-compliance often implies
that the nal level of undeclared income is reached through a process of bargaining between
the taxpayer and the tax authority. While a potentially interesting extension to the present
analysis, for simplicity I do not develop this aspect of the model.
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q = h [L] = h


p

, (7)
where   b=n is the per-capita budget of the tax authority. The inverse rela-
tionship between p and q makes clear the trade-o¤ in audit strategy between
audit probability and e¤ectiveness. Di¤erentiating (7) I have that
@q
@p
=
@h [=p]
@p
=  

q
p

eq < 0, (8)
where eq [L]  Lh0 [L] =h [L] is the elasticity of audit e¤ectiveness with respect
to labor and satises eq 2 (0; 1).2
I am now able to bring together the budget constraint q = h [=p] and
the taxpayer behavioral function x [p; qf ] to dene a function X [p; f ] 
x [p; h [=p] f ] that describes the compliance behavior of taxpayers, taking
explicit account of the endogeneity of the e¤ective ne rate.
The problem facing the tax authority is to choose the audit probability so
as to maximize expected revenue, subject to its budget constraint and its
understanding of the behavioral response of taxpayers (as summarized by
taxpayersrst order condition). Expected revenue is composed of that gen-
erated directly in nes from non-compliance detected at audit (direct e¤ect),
and that arising indirectly from voluntary compliance induced by the threat
of audit (indirect e¤ect), giving:
max
p
E [R] = n fX [p; f ] + ph [=p] f (y  X [p; f ])g . (9)
Di¤erentiating E [R] in (9) with respect to p gives:
2That eq < 1 follows from assumption A7.
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@E [R]
@p
 G [X; p] = n

(Wg  Wb) (1  eq) + @X [p; f ]
@p
(1  ph [=p] f)

;
(10)
where, from (3),
@X [p; f ]
@p
=   
D

U 0 [Wg]  U 0 [Wb] f1  fh [=p] (1  eq)g
+eq (h [=p] f   1) (Wg  Wb)U 00 [Wb]

. (11)
The tax authoritys rst order condition for an interior maximum is therefore
G [X; p] = 0, which implicitly denes a function X [p; f ] that maps taxpay-
ersoptimal income declaration given the ne rate and the tax authoritys
optimal choice of audit probability.
It is instructive to explore the region of  that generates interior optima
for compliance. In particular, there exist ( ,) such that taxpayersoptimal
income declaration can be written as:
X [p; f ;  ]
8<:
= 0    ;
2 (0; y)  2 ( ; ) ;
= y    ;
where ( ,) are the unique solutions to
U 0 [y]
U 0 [y (1  h [=p [ ]] f)] =
p [ ] (h [=p [ ]] f   1)
1  p [ ] ; h [ ] f = 1. (12)
The expression for  derives from the full-compliance outcome (pqf = 1),
which is always the equilibrium of the model if it is feasible. As ph [=p] is
increasing in p, pqf = 1 is achieved at least cost by setting p = 1, from which
the result follows. The expression for  is simply the rst inequality in (5).
So far as I know, there are no tax authorities so lavishly funded as to have
eliminated non-compliance, nor any so impoverished as to be unable to en-
force any positive level of compliance. Therefore, were the model calibrated
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empirically, I would expect observed values of  to be consistent with an in-
terior solution for compliance. In this sense, while a corner solution for com-
pliance remains a theoretical possibility, from a positive standpoint, analysis
pertaining to interior equilibria of the model is of greater signicance. This
point is of importance in what follows, as the analysis makes strong predic-
tions about behavior in all equilibria with an interior solution for compliance.
The problem in (9) is not a standard concave maximization problem in that
the objective function is convex and the constraint function is neither globally
concave nor convex (Figure 1). I am nevertheless able to state my rst
Proposition, establishing the existence of a unique optimal choice of p by the
tax authority (all proofs being in the Appendix):
Proposition 1 For  2 ( ,) there exists a unique p 2 (0; 1) such that
G [X; p;  ] = 0 and X [p; f ;  ] 2 (0; y) as the solution to the tax authoritys
problem.
The proof of existence establishes that G [X; p] switches sign on a sub-interval
of (0; 1) which guarantees the result by continuity. The proof of uniqueness
is complicated by the fact that X [p; f ] is convex for p close to zero, and con-
cave thereafter. The former problem is overcome by noting that X [p; f ] is
increasing on the convex interval, so this feature of the model does not gen-
erate multiple equilibria, while the possibility of the objective and constraint
functions coinciding, except at a single point, on the concave interval is ruled
out by consideration of the roots of the constraint and objective functions at
x = 0.
In the event that the tax authoritys budget does not lie on the interval [ ;  ],
however unlikely in practice, then compliance is a corner solution, and the
properties of the equilibrium are as follows:
Proposition 2 If
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i)    the equilibrium satises p = 1, q = h [ ], x = 0;
ii)    the equilibrium satises ph [=p] f = 1, x = y.
In part (i) of the Proposition, the tax authority is insu¢ ciently resourced
to generate a positive indirect e¤ect, so seeks solely to maximize the direct
e¤ect. This is achieved by maximizing the value of ph [=p], which implies
p = 1. By contrast, in part (ii), the indirect e¤ect is maximal, and the direct
e¤ect is zero.
4 Analysis
In this section, I explore the properties of interior solutions of the model in
order to contrast the predictions owing from the taxpayer behavioral func-
tion x [p; qf ], which has all the properties of the standard portfolio model,
with the equilibrium predictions of the full model, as represented byX [p; f ].
4.1 Compliance
A well-known prediction of the standard model is that an increase in au-
dit probability increases compliance, i.e. @x [p; qf ] =@p > 0. However, the
ceteris paribus condition under which qf is held constant implicitly pre-
supposes an accompanying increase in the tax authoritys budget. Under the
extension to balanced-budget analysis I obtain the following Proposition:
Proposition 3 At all interior equilibria an increase in audit probability de-
creases compliance: @X
[p;f ]
@p
< 0.
Proposition 3 follows immediately from the tax authoritys rst order condi-
tion in (10). The rst term in (10) is the marginal change in the direct e¤ect
from an increase in p, while the second term captures the marginal change
in the indirect e¤ect. The former e¤ect is always positive, while the latter
takes the sign of @X [p; f ] =@p. For @X [p; f ] =@p > 0 both the indirect and
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direct e¤ect are increasing in p, so @X [p; f ] =@p > 0 is never optimal. By
similar reasoning, @X [p; f ] =@p = 0 (the compliance maximizing choice of
p), is never optimal. Instead, the optimal audit probaility must be such that
@X [p; f ] =@p < 0. At the optimal audit probability the marginal increase in
the direct e¤ect is fully o¤set by the marginal decrease in the indirect e¤ect,
so not only is the indirect e¤ect negative at an interior optimum, it is also
strong enough to o¤set the direct e¤ect.
An implication of Proposition 3 is that audit probability is optimally set
higher than the compliance maximizing level, and audit e¤ectiveness is set
lower than the compliance maximizing level. This suggests a tension between
the role of the tax authority as a law enforcer (as envisaged by Becker), and
as a revenue raiser: to maximize expected revenue the tax authority nds
it optimal to tolerate a degree of non-compliance that it could, if it chose,
prevent.
The Proposition relies both on the assumptions that the tax authority max-
imizes expected revenue and that audit e¤ectiveness is endogenous. First,
were the tax authority assumed to maximize compliance, then @X [p; f ] =@p =
0 would, by assumption, dene the optimal choice of p. Second, if audit ef-
fectiveness were to be assumed exogenous, which is equivalent to setting
eq = 0, there would be no trade-o¤ between audit probability and e¤ective-
ness and the standard result of the Beckerian framework would re-emerge:
@X [p; f ] =@p = @x [p; qf ] =@p > 0.
Intuition alone would convince most that, when audit e¤ectiveness is en-
dogenous and the tax authority is resource-constrained, an increase in audit
probability might lead overall compliance to fall if audit e¤ectiveness falls
su¢ ciently fast and if taxpayer behavior is su¢ ciently responsive to audit
e¤ectiveness. The salience of Proposition 3 from a theoretical perspective is
that it demonstrates that at any interior optima, it is necessarily the case
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that these two conditions are met. The salience of the result from an em-
pirical perspective is that it applies to the type of audit regimes observed
empirically: those that generate less than full compliance.3
4.2 E¤ective Fine Rate
As a straightforward application of the envelope theorem, it can be shown
that expected revenue is a (weakly) increasing function of f (and strictly
increasing for  < ). As such, the model retains the basic insight behind
Beckers hang em with probability zero equilibrium: unless equilibrium
non-compliance is already zero, if the tax authority is able to increase f , it
has the incentive to do so.
However, in the present model, the tax authority is not able to choose f , but
is able to choose the e¤ective ne rate, qf , through its choice of q. What
this approach reveals is that, even were the tax authority able to convince
the relevant legislatures to approve a high f , it would in turn be optimal for
the tax authority to reduce q (and increase p), such that the e¤ective ne
rate turns out to be bounded at all interior equilibria.
Proposition 4 At all interior equilibria the e¤ective ne rate on undetected
tax satises qf < 2.
Some intuition for Proposition 4 lies in the observation that the equilibrium
qf is not monotonically increasing as a function of f . To see this, rst note
that, analogous to ( ; ), there exist (f; f), which denote the upper and lower
bounds of f consistent with an interior equilibria for compliance. Then:
qf
8<:
 1 f  f ;
> 1 f 2  f; f ;
= 1 f  f:
3Proposition 3 also lies behind a number of other surprising results. For instance,
in equilibrium, per-audit yield (Wg  Wb) is an increasing function of audit probability.
By contrast, in the standard model per-audit yield decreases in audit probability, as an
increase in p increases voluntary compliance.
15
For f  f , we have p = 1 from Proposition 2, in which case to have T [x; p] <
0 in (3) requires qf < 1. For f 2  f; f the condition is implied by the
interior conditions for compliance in (5). For f = f the result is immediate
from (12) as p = pqf = 1.
The above arguments demonstrate that qf is increasing in f as f # f , but
decreasing as f " f , so qf attains a local maximum on the interval f 2  f; f.
The proof of Proposition 4 demonstrates that all such interior equilibria
satisfy qf 2  1;min p 1; (1  p) 1, which is a sub-interval of (1; 2) for
p 2 (0; 1). The non-monotonicity of qf reects the balanced budget trade-
o¤ between audit probability and the e¤ective ne rate: for a xed f , an
increase in qf requires a compensating reduction in p. Because q is subject to
diminishing returns, it follows that raising the e¤ective ne rate indenitely
is not optimal.
A bounded e¤ective ne rate therefore emerges as the optimal choice of the
tax authority, rather than being articially imposed. The result ts closely
with empirical evidence: the Internal Revenue Code species f = 1:75 for
fraudulent returns, while HMRC apply f = 2 for intentional non-compliance,
both of which imply an e¤ective ne rate of less than two (assuming q < 1).
4.3 Audit Expenditure
Suppose that the tax authority receives an exogenous increase in  , either as
a result of an increase in b, or a fall in n.
Proposition 5 As  "  it holds that:
lim"
@p
@
> 0; lim"
@q
@
< 0; lim"
@X[p;f ]
@
< 0.
Simple intuition for the comparative static result for audit probability is
as follows. I have from (12) that p j= = 1, but interior optima satisfy
pqf < 1 and qf > 1, which together imply p < 1=qf < 1. Therefore audit
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probability must be increasing as  "  . Similarly for q, I have from (12) that
q j= = 1=f , but the interior conditions imply q > 1=f , so audit e¤ectiveness
must be decreasing as  "  . Formally, a necessary and su¢ cient condition for
these two results is that =p is decreasing in  (@p=@ > p=) as  "  . The
proof proceeds by contradiction to show that if @p=@ = p= as  "  , then
the respective rst order conditions for the taxpayer and the tax authority
are not simultaneously satised.
The comparative static results for p and q are proved only local to  =  , for
model complexity frustrated all attempts at a more general result. However,
Figure 2 depicts the optimal audit regime for a simulation of the model
with logarithmic utility, U [y] = ln y, (which implies constant relative risk
aversion) and exponential audit e¤ectiveness, h [L] = 1   e 2L. For this
simple specication of the model, and choosing reasonable values for the ne
and tax rates (f = 1:5,  = 0:3), p and q respond monotonically to  over
the whole interval  2 [ ;  ].4 In these cases audit e¤ectiveness is an inferior
input in the productionof expected revenue.
The nal result in Proposition 5 is that optimal compliance is non-monotonic
in  near  =  (Figure 3). Although optimal compliance is seen to fall in this
region, nevertheless expected revenue continues to increase: the tax authority
chooses to allow non-compliance to increase in response to an increase in  ,
even though it could choose to allow it to decrease. Some intuition from the
result is seen by rewriting expected revenue in (9) as:
E [R] = n f (1  pqf)X [p; f ] + pqfyg . (13)
The rst term in (13) is dependent on the level of compliance, while the
second is independent of the level of compliance. Near  =  I have that
4The level of income, y, can be chosen arbitrarily under constant relative risk aversion,
as the taxpayers optimal compliance (x [p; qf ]) is linear in income, so y acts only as a
scale parameter.
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pqf ! 1, so, from (13), the compliance-independent component accounts
for an increasing proportion of total expected revenue. In the limit, the
costs of lowering X [p; f ] become dominated by the gains from increasing
the compliance-independent component of expected revenue.
5 Extensions
5.1 Probability Weighting
A prominent feature of descriptive accounts of decision-making under risk is
that individuals tend to overweight unlikely outcomes and underweight likely
outcomes, relative to their objective probabilities (Kahneman and Tversky,
1979; Neilson, 2003). Consistent with this idea, empirical studies of tax-
payers subjective beliefs about their audit probability suggest that many
subjects overestimate this (low) probability (e.g. Alm et al., 1992; Scholz
and Pinney, 1995). It is therefore of interest to examine how this considera-
tion alters the analysis of the previous section.
Following the insights of Quiggin (1982), probability weighting is modelled
by a transformation of the cumulative probability distribution according to a
probability weighting function, w [p], on which I make the following assump-
tions. First, w [p] is continuous, di¤erentiable on p 2 (0; 1), strictly increas-
ing, and satises w [0] = 0 and w [1] = 1. Second, there exists a pf 2 (0; 1)
at which w [p] intersects the diagonal from above. Third, it is concave on an
initial interval and convex beyond that (s-shaped). The various functional
forms for w [p] so far proposed in the literature (e.g. Rieger and Wang, 2006;
Prelec, 1998; Tversky and Fox, 1994; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) satisfy
these assumptions.
Denoting (x; p; q) as the equilibrium of the model of Section 3 (without
probability weighting) and (xw; pw; qw) as the equilibrium of the model with
probability weighting, I then have the following Proposition:
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Proposition 6 If taxpayers transform the objective audit probability accord-
ing to w[p] then for p 2 (0; 1):
i) As p # 0 it holds that pw > p;
ii) If p = pf then pw < p;
iii) As p " 1 it holds that pw > p.
Proposition 6 makes clear that probability weighting can either increase or
decrease the optimal audit probability depending on the level of p. At
extreme audit probabilities - including the most realistic case of p close to
zero - the tax authority chooses a higher audit probability under probability
weighting. However, in an interval around the xed point at pf , probability
weighting lowers the tax authoritys optimal choice of p. The explanation is
that the optimal p depends both on the level of w [p] and its slope, w0 [p].
When w [] is overweighting there is an incentive to reduce p, as the bias
in taxpayers judgments is a substitute for the objective audit probability.
However, when w0 [p] > 1 there is an incentive to raise p, since w [p] increases
faster than p. Close to p = 0 and p = 1, I have w [p]  p and w0 [p] > 1,
so the slope e¤ect dominates, and is positive. At the xed point, however, I
have w0 [pf ] < 1, so the slope e¤ect is negative.
5.2 Uncertainty
The previous section assumes that taxpayers know the tax authoritys choice
of the audit probability and e¤ectiveness. In practice, however, the tax
authority does not normally announce its choice, and there may be sound
theoretical grounds for maintaining secrecy (Alm, 1988; Snow and Warren
Jr., 2005a). Therefore, taxpayers typically face uncertainty over both of these
parameters. Let (ep; eq) be random variables describing taxpayersuncertainty
about (p; q), where I assume that taxpayersexpectations about (p; q) are
rational in the sense that E [ep] = p and E [eq] = q. Let (xu; pu; qu) denote the
equilibrium under uncertainty, then I have the following Proposition:
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Proposition 7 Under p-uncertainty it holds that pu = p and qu = q.
Proposition 7 demonstrates that the analysis of Section 4 is robust to tax-
payer uncertainty over p. The result arises as a straightforward consequence
of the linearity of taxpayersexpected utility in audit probability. Formally,
suppose ep is distributed according to P ["], then taxpayersexpected utility
is
E [U ] = U [Wg]

1 
Z
" dP ["]

+ U [Wb]
Z
" dP ["] . (14)
However, as rational expectations imply that
R
" dG ["] = p, equation (14)
is equivalent to (1). The tax authoritys optimization problem is therefore
unchanged.
Turning to q-uncertainty, suppose eq is distributed according to Q ["], then
the taxpayersrst order condition in (3) becomes

Z
fp ("f   1)U 0 [Wb ["]]  (1  p)U 0 [Wg ["]]g dQ ["] = 0,
and (11) becomes
@Xu [p; f ]
@p
=  

U 0 [Wg] +
R
("f   1  qfeq)U 0 [Wb ["]] dQ ["]
+eq (Wg  Wb)
R
("f   1)U 00 [Wb ["]] dQ ["]



(1  p)U 00 [Wg] + p
R
("f   1)2 U 00 [Wb ["]] dQ ["]
	 . (15)
Comparing (11) and (15), how the tax authoritys problem is a¤ected by
q-uncertainty is determined by whether the integrals in (15) are increasing
or decreasing under a mean-preserving spread of Q ["]. From the results
of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1971), an integrand increases (decreases) with
a mean-preserving spread if it is convex (concave). It follows immediately
from (15), therefore, that the e¤ects of q-uncertainty for (p; q) depend on
both the third and fourth derivatives of the utility function. Kimball (1990)
shows that assumption A3 (DARA) implies that U 000 > 0 - a property which
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Menezes et al. (1980) term downside risk aversion.5 Together, assumptions
A2 and A3 therefore imply that  U 000=U 00 > 0, a property Kimball (1990)
terms prudence.
However, in order to sign the fourth derivative of utility, I introduce the
stronger concept of standard risk aversion (Kimball, 1993). Taxpayers are
standard risk averse if their preferences satisfy DARA (A3) and decreas-
ing absolute prudence (DAP). The latter property is that  U 000 [x] =U 00 [x] is
decreasing in x, which Kimball (1993) shows to imply U 0000 < 0.6 Because
DARA is still assumed, a standard risk averse taxpayer is necessarily down-
side risk averse and prudent. A standard risk averse taxpayer is also proper
risk aversein the sense of Pratt and Zeckhauser (1987). I then have a nal
Proposition.
Proposition 8 If
i) Taxpayers are standard risk averse;
ii) Taxpayer beliefs satisfy
eqmax

qf;
1  p
2p

< qf   1 < eq

1  p
p

;
then, under q-uncertainty, pu < p and qu > q.
The proof of Proposition 8 proceeds by analyzing the second derivatives of
the integrands in (15) at the equilibrium of the model. Under the restrictions
of the Proposition, I am able to prove that @X [p; f ] =@p > @Xu [p; f ] =@p.
As the tax authority operates on the downward sloping interval of X [p; f ]
5Menezes et al. (1980) dene an increase in downside risk to be a mean-and-variance
preserving shift of probability to the lower tail of the distribution. They show that aversion
to downside risk is equivalent to U 000 > 0.
6Kimball (1990) shows that absolute prudence  U 000=U 00 measures the strength of the
precautionary saving motive, so that DAP can be interpreted as a precautionary saving
motive that decreases in intensity with wealth.
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(Figure 1), to restore equilibrium it must raise p, from which the result fol-
lows. The restrictions in (ii) place limits on the dispersion of taxpayer beliefs
around the true value of q. In particular, they require that taxpayers believe
that the e¤ective ne rate satises qf > 1. If taxpayers place su¢ cient prob-
ability weight on the possibility that qf < 1, then the relative magnitudes of
pu and p can be reversed.
6 Conclusion
The economics of tax compliance has developed as a special case of Beckers
(1968) model of crime and punishment. However, tax evasion is in some ways
a unique type of crime, making it worthwhile exploring the implications of
alternative assumptions. In particular, the political economy considerations
inherent in the enforcement of compliance imply that the tax authority is not
a simple law enforcer, but also plays an economic role in raising government
revenue. I therefore consider the private objective function of the tax author-
ity to maximize expected revenue, rather than assuming the maximization
of social welfare. Second, with ne rates severely constrained in practice, I
instead analyze the trade-o¤ between audit probability and e¤ectiveness.
Characterizing the tax authority in this way leads to some descriptively im-
portant changes to the predictions of the standard portfolio model. In par-
ticular, I have shown that at any interior equilibrium - the type that we
observe empirically - the expected-revenue maximizing audit strategy does
not maximize voluntary compliance, and that increases in the tax author-
itys budget can lead to falls in voluntary compliance, while still increasing
expected revenue. While not contradicting the intuition of Beckers hang
em with probability zeroequilibrium, the model nevertheless leads to the
conclusion that the tax authority will choose to set an e¤ective ne rate that
does not exceed two - a prediction closely in line with observed practice.
There are further extensions of the model that future research might prof-
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itably explore. For instance, a key assumption one would like to relax is
that of homogeneous taxpayers, which in turn might allow for an integration
of the present approach with the literature on the design of audit selection
rules. The model can also be used to derive policy implications for tax au-
thorities considering changes to their audit portfolio through, for instance,
the introduction of light-touchaudits - audit types that can be performed
quickly and cheaply - as a partial replacement for (longer and more expen-
sive) traditional audit types.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Existence: I begin by showing that limp#0G [X; p] > 0. As p # 0 I have that
h [=p] " 1 and eq # 0. Therefore, (11) gives
limp#0 @X [p; f ] =@p =   limp#0 (=D) (U 0 [Wg] + (f   1)U 0 [Wb]) > 0,
which, in turn, implies that limp#0G [X; p] = n limp#0

Wg  Wb +  @X[p;f ]@p

>
0. I now show thatG [X; p] < 0 where p = (h [=p] f   1) = (h [=p] f   1 + eq) <
1. Setting G [X; p] = 0 in (10), and substituting for @X[p;f ]
@p
from (11) I obtain:
(Wg  Wb)

(1  p) (1  eq)U 00 [Wg]
  (qf   1) feq (1  p)  p (qf   1)gU 00 [Wb]

= (1  pqf) fU 0 [Wg]  f1  qf (1  eq)gU 0 [Wb]g (A.1)
Suppose, by contradiction, that eq = p (qf   1) = (1  p), then substituting
in (A.1) obtains (Wg  Wb)U 00 [Wg] = (qf   1) (U 0 [Wb]  U 0 [Wg]), which is
a contradiction since the l.h.s. is negative and the r.h.s. is positive, implying
G [X; p] < 0. It follows, by continuity, that there exists a p satisfying p > 0
and p < (h [=p] f   1) = (h [=p] f   1 + eq) such that G [X; p] = 0.
Uniqueness: I rst show that E [R] is a convex function of (x; p): the de-
terminant of the Hessian matrix is jHj = (fn@ (ph [=p]) =@p)2 > 0. The
iso-expected revenue curves in Figure 1 are therefore concave to the origin.
The constraint X [p; f ] is not globally concave because, taking q as constant,
compliance is an increasing and convex function of p. Since q is approximately
constant close to unity, X [p; f ] is increasing and convex for p su¢ ciently close
to zero. However, to generate multiple equilibria would require X [p; f ] to be
downward sloping on the convex interval, and for the convex interval to be
sandwiched between two concave intervals, neither of which is the case.
It remains to check whether the constraint and objective functions coincide
at more than a single point on the interval where both are concave. To
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see this is not the case, note that iso-expected revenue intersects the line
x = 0 for p = pR, where pR = 1=h [=pR] f . The constraint X [p; f ] inter-
sects x = 0 for p = px (which may not be unique), where (1  px)U 0 [y]  
px (h [=px] f   1)U 0 [y (1  h [=px] f)] = 0. Substituting pR into the deni-
tion of px yields ((h [=pR] f   1) =h [=pR] f) (U 0 [y]  U 0 [y (1  h [=pR] f)]) <
0, from which it follows that that px < pR.
Proof of Proposition 2
Part (i): If x = 0 then E [R] = pqfy. Since @ (pq) =@p = q + p (@q=@p) =
q (1  eq) > 0 it follows that @E [R] =@p > 0, implying a corner solution at
p = 1.
Part (ii): If pqf = 1 is feasible (  ) then there is always a solution to
G [X; p] = 0 in (10), since it implies that x = y, so also Wg = Wb.
Proof of Proposition 3
From (10) it is immediate that G [X; p] = 0 implies
@X [p; f ] =@p =   (Wg  Wb) (1  eq) = f (1  pqf)g < 0.
Proof of Proposition 4
From (5) an interior equilibrium for compliance must satisfy qf < p 1. I now
show that all interior equilibria also satisfy the inequality qf < (1  p) 1.
Suppose, by contradiction, that qf = (1  p) 1, so p = (qf   1) =qf and
pqf = qf 1. Substituting p = (qf   1) =qf in (3) gives U 0 [Wg] (qf   1)2 U 0 [Wb] =
0. Now also suppose  =  which implies eq = pqf . Substituting for eq in
(A.1) I obtain
G [X; p] = 0, (Wg  Wb) f(1  p)U 00 [Wg]  p (qf   1)U 00 [Wb]g
= U 0 [Wg]  f1  qf (1  pqf)gU 0 [Wb] . (A.2)
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Substituting from (3) in both sides gives:
G [X; p] = 0, (Wg  Wb) (1  p)U 0 [Wg] fA [Wb]  A [Wg]g
= p 1

U 0 [Wg]  (qf   1)2 U 0 [Wb]
	
= 0,
But this is a contradiction since the l.h.s. is strictly positive by assumption
A3 (DARA), while the r.h.s. is zero. It follows that (U 0 [Wg]  f1  qf (1  pqf)gU 0 [Wb])
cannot be zero at an interior equilibrium. Instead, for  2 ( ; ) ; it must hold
that (U 0 [Wg]  f1  qf (1  pqf)gU 0 [Wb]) < 0. This implies that U 0 [Wg] =U 0 [Wb] <
1 qf (1  pqf). Using (3) I have that U 0 [Wg] =U 0 [Wb] = p (qf   1) = (1  p),
so, solving the resulting quadratic in (qf), this implies that qf 2  1;min p 1; (1  p) 1.
Then maxpmin

p 1; (1  p) 1 = 2 (at p = 1=2), implying qf < 2.
Proof of Proposition 5
Suppose, by contradiction, that @p=@ = p= , such that @q=@ = @h [=p] =@ =
0. Then an increase in  in (3) leaves q unchanged and increases p. To restore
the rst order condition it follows that
@X[p;f ]
@p
 @p
@
= p

=   (=D [X; p]) (U 0 [Wg] + (qf   1)U 0 [Wb]) > 0. In the limit
as  "  I have that Wg  Wb ! 0 and qf ! 1, in which case @X[p;f ]@p
 @p
@
= p

collapses to lim"
@X[p;f ]
@p
 @p
@
= p

=  U 0 [Wg] = f (1  p)U 00 [Wg]g > 0. A fur-
ther expression for lim"
@X[p;f ]
@p
 @p
@
= p

is derived by total di¤erentiation of
the equality in (A.1), giving
lim"
@X[p;f ]
@p
 @p
@
= p

=  f(1  eq) =eqg fU 0 [Wg] = f (1  p)U 00 [Wg]gg.
The two expressions are equal i¤ lim" (1  eq) =eq = 1, which establishes a
contradiction since lim" eq = 1. From analysis of derivatives it follows that
lim" @p=@ > p= > 0, so also lim" @q=@ < 0.
To establish the sign of lim" @X [p; f ] =@ I can now denote @p=@ = p= ,
where  > 1 is a scalar. It follows that @q
@
 @p
@
=p

= qeq

(1  ) < 0. Di¤er-
entiating T [X; p] = 0 in (3) I have that:
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@X [p; f ]
@
 @p
@
=p

? 0,  7  eq fqfU
0 [Wb]  (qf   1) (Wg  Wb)U 00 [Wb]g
U 0 [Wg]  U 0 [Wb] f1  fq (1  eq)g
+eq (qf   1) (Wg  Wb)U 00 [Wb]
 :
(A.3)
In the limit as  "  , (A.3) implies that  >   lim" eq= (1  eq) < 0, so it
must be that lim" @X [p; f ] =@ < 0.
Proof of Proposition 6
Part (i): Under probability weighting (11) becomes:
@xw
@pw
=  


Ew
( w0 [pw]  U 0 Wwg + (qwf   1)U 0 [Wwb ]
+ewq

w[pw]
pw

(qwf   1)  Wwg  Wwb U 00 [Wwb ]  qwfU 0 [Wwb ]	
)
,
where Ew = 2

w [pw] (qwf   1)2 U 00 [Wwb ] + (1  w [pw])U 00

Wwg
	
. Sup-
pose, by contradiction, that (pw; xw) = (p; x) then I have that:
@xw
@pw
  @x

@p
=


DE
8<: p
 U 0 W g + (qf   1)U 0 [W b ]	w [p] (1  ew) (qf   1)2 U 00 [W b ]
+p f1  w0 [p]  w [p] (1  ew)gU 00

W g

 eq (w [p]  p)U 00

W g
 
(qf   1)  W g  W b   qfU 0 [W b ]	
9=; ,
(A.4)
where ew is the elasticity of w [p]. As p # 0 I have that w [p] = p, so ew [0] =
w0 [0] > 1. This implies that 1   w0 [0]   w [0] (1  ew [0]) = 1   w0 [0] < 0.
Using these observations in (A.4) yields that @x
w
@pw
  @x
@p > 0, contradicting the
supposed solution at (pw; xw) = (p; x). Since @G [x; p] =@p < 0 it follows
that pw > p, and therefore qw < q.
Part (ii): At p = pf I have ew = w
0 [pf ] < 1 and 1 w0 [p] w [p] (1  ew) =
(1  w [pf ]) (1  w0 [pf ]) > 0. Hence, @xw@pw   @x

@p < 0, contradicting the sup-
posed solution at (pw; xw) = (p; x). Since @G [x; p] =@p < 0 it follows that
pw < p, and therefore qw > q.
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Part (iii): As p " 1 I have ew [1] = w0 [1] > 1 and 1 w0 [1] w [1] (1  ew [1]) =
0. An analogous argument to Part (i) therefore applies.
Proof of Proposition 8
Substituting (15) into (10) gives
(Wg  Wb)

(1  p) (1  eq)U 00 [Wg]
  R ("f   1) feq (1  p)  p ("f   1)gU 00 [Wb ["]] dQ ["]

= (1  pqf)

U 0 [Wg] +
Z
("f   1  qfeq)U 0 [Wb ["]] dQ ["]

. (A.5)
Suppose, en route to a contradiction, that (p; x) = (pu; xu) then both (A.5)
and the equivalent relation under certainty (A.1) must hold. Taking the
second derivative of the integrand in the r.h.s. of (A.5) gives
@2 ("f   1  qfeq)
(@")2
=  

Wg  Wb
q

2U 00 [Wb]  ("f   1  qfeq)Wg  Wb
q
U 000 [Wb]

.
(A.6)
Within the second bracket, the rst term is negative under risk aversion and
the second is negative under downside risk aversion (as " > (1 + qfeq) =f
by assumption). According to Rothschild and Stiglitz (1971), an integrand
increases (decreases) with a mean-preserving spread if it is convex (concave).
Therefore (A.6) implies
Z
("f   1  qfeq)U 0 [Wb ["]] dQ ["] > (qf   1  qfeq)U 0 [Wb] .
Using the assumption of decreasing absolute prudence, which implies U 0000 <
0, similar reasoning can be used to show that, if beliefs satisfy (eq (1  p) + 2p) =2pf <
" < (eq (1  p) + p) =pf , then
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Z
("f   1) feq (1  p)  p ("f   1)gU 00 [Wb ["]] dQ ["]
> (qf   1) feq (1  p)  p (qf   1)gU 00 [Wb] .
But then (A.1) and (A.5) cannot hold for (p; x) = (pu; xu) as the l.h.s. of
(A.5) is smaller than the l.h.s. of (A.1), while the r.h.s. of (A.5) exceeds the
r.h.s. of (A.1). Instead, it must hold that @X [p; f ] =@p > @Xu [p; f ] =@p. In
order to restore (10) it must hold that pu < p , which implies qu > q and,
as @X [p; f ] =@p < 0, xu > x.
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Figure 1: Equilibrium between taxpayers and the tax authority.
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Figure 2: Optimal audit probability and e¤ectiveness (for CRRA utilty and
h [L] as the exponential distribution function).
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Figure 3: Optimal compliance and expected revenue (for CRRA utilty and
h [L] as the exponential distribution function).
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